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INSURANCE LAW: PUBLIC POLICY PERMITS
INSURING AGAINST ONE'S OWN INTENTIONAL ACTS
OF DISCRIMINATION
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc.,
509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987)
Appellant insurance company provided liability insurance to a private club.1 Appellee club looked to appellant for coverage and defense 2
of a religious discrimination suitA The suit commenced when third
parties claimed that appellee's rules operated to deprive them of their
right to purchase property. 4 The complaint alleged violations under
the United States Constitution,5 42 U.S.C. § 1982,6 and local ordinances. 7 Appellee settled the suit and sought indemnification under
its insurance policy with appellant." Appellant then sought a declaration of no coverage under appellee's insurance policy. 9 The trial court
entered summary judgment against appellant. 10 On appeal, the Florida

1. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 940, 941 (1985), affd on reh'g,
509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (en banc).
2. Id. at 942. The personal injury liability coverage provided in part: "'The company will
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of personal injury." Id.
3. Id. at 946. The court characterized the issue as "tortious interference with a contract
when the tortious interference involved amounts to intentional religious discrimination." Id. at
n.1; see Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v Strong, 300 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1974) (right to
contract and to use property are fundamental rights guaranteed by federal and state constitutions).
4. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 949 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). The deed restricted the use of the
property to "Caucasians," while excluding anyone with "more than one-fourth Hebrew or Syrian
blood." Although the restriction had expired, appellee required that all purchasers first obtain
membership to the club. The complaint alleged that the requirement operated to exclude Jews
from membership. Id.
5. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment)); see also FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (declaring all natural persons equal before the law, with inalienable rights to acquire,
possess, and protect property); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 43940 (1968)
(thirteenth amendment authorized Congress to enact legislation such as 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
6. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 949 n.2 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). The statute grants to all citizens
the right to purchase and sell real property. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
7. Rangeir, 509 So. 2d at 949 n.3 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 949. The insurer negotiated a $25,000 settlement that appellee was to pay. The
appellee alleged that the insurance policy covered the claim. Id.
9. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 941.
10. Id. The court ordered appellant to indemnify appellee in the amount of the settlement.
Id.
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Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment and
held that no exclusions precluded recovery under the policy's personal
injury provision.,, On rehearing en banc, 12 the court affirmed and
HELD, public policy does not prohibit insurance recovery for a loss
resulting from an intentional act of religious discrimination.'s
The freedom to insure against intentional wrongs has never been
absolute. 14 From the inception of the liability insurance policy over
one hundred years ago,' 5 one question has prevailed: whether public
policy permits insuring against one's own intentional wrongs. Historically, courts addressing this question have balanced society's interest
in compensation, and the insured's
in deterrence, the victim's interest
16
interest in indemnification.
In balancing these interests, Florida courts have focused on the
rights of the parties as expressed in the agreement. 17 Although the

11.

Id. at 944.

12. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 945. After concluding the original rehearing, the court denied
appellants motion for an additional rehearing. Id. at 948.
13. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (granting the Florida Supreme Court authority
to review questions of great public importance)). Faced with a novel issue, Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal certified the following question: "Does the public policy of Florida
prohibit an insured from being indemnified for a loss resulting from an intentional act of religious
discrimination?" Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 948. The court observed that "no Florida case has decided
the precise issue considered in this case. . . ." Id. at 946 (citing, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal
Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 1980) (contract excluded intentional acts, thus court did
not consider whether acts also excluded by public policy); City of Greensboro v. Reserve Ins.
Co., 70 N.C. App. 651, 657, 321 S.E.2d 232, 236 (1984) (because record was inadequate to
determine whether discrimination occurred, court did not reach public policy issue); School Dist.
No. 1 v. Multnomah County Mission Ins. Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 701 n.4, 650 P.2d 929, 936 n.4
(1981) (because contract excluded discrimination, court declined to decide whether uninsurable
as a matter of law)).
14. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 584, 585 (IV. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
(in the beginning, "P1liability insurance was attacked as . . . encouragement to antisocial conduct.").
15. Id. "[Tihe separate liability policy ... developed first as a means of protecting employers." Id.
16. See Lenz, Limiting the Role of Insurancein Civil Rights Litigation:A Casefor Re-Establishing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an Enforcement Mechanism, 5 J. CORP. L. 305, 327 (1980)
(issue not between two extremes, but rather a balancing test).
17. See Green v. Quincy State Bank, 368 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979) ('rights
existing under a valid contract enjoy constitutional protection"); New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Luxury Home Builders, Inc., 311 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975) ("A contract
right ... should not be impaired or abrogated by a court."); cf.Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Cartmel, 87 Fla. 495, 499, 100 So. 802, 803 (1924) (insurance contracts to be read in favor of
insured (quoting National Sur. Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446, 474-76 (Fla. 1917))).

CASE COMMENTS

courts consider public policy", when interpreting contracts, the rights

of both the victim and the insured have controlled recent decisions.' 9
Society's deterrence interest, based on the theory that one should not
profit from one's own wrong,20 became a secondary consideration. Absent an express exclusion for particular acts, Florida courts enforced
21
insurance contracts that indemnify parties against their own wrongs.
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Spreen,2 2 the Florida Third

District Court of Appeal adhered to contract principles in defining the
18. See Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927) (since public policy is vague and
variable, contracts are held void only in clear cases); U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So.
2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983) (exception to public policy exclusion when insured is vicariously liable
for acts of wrongdoer (citing Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898, 900 (3d D.C.A.),
cert. de;iied, 194 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1966))); see also City of Cedar Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Iowa 1981) (simpler to allow damages against insurer than
against taxpayers). But see Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433
(5th Cir. 1962) (Florida public policy prohibits insurance against liability for punitive damages);
Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 244, 310 A.2d 485, 488 (1973) ("New Jersey
public policy denies insurance indemnity for the civil consequences of one's own intentional
wrongdoings.").
19. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 573 n.67 (1985).
Professor Sugarman explains the importance of liability insurance:
Without insurance, fear of an enormous tort judgment could have a strong,
socially undesirable impact. Many individuals.. . might abandon driving because
of the risk . . . . IT]he risk of losing one's capital as a result of enormous tort
liability might deter the formation of small businesses . . . . [Tihese examples
represent overdeterrence - the undesirable squelching of socially acceptable behavior.
By contrast, large enterprises could deal sensibly with the unavailabilty of
liability insurance through self-insurance.
Id.; see also Brown, "Accidental Loss" and Liability Insurance, 5 OTAGO L. REV. 523, 542
(1984) (liability insurance allows for carelessness when it may be beneficial to do so).
20. See Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921)
(Cardozo, J.) ("[N]o one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong."). This phrase
has become an axiom of the common law. See Solo Cup. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178,
1187 (7th Cir. 1980); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1962); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 398, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814,
442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 426 (1981); Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956).
21. See U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 1983) ("Non-insurability
is a defensive matter, with the burden resting on the insurer."); cf. Halpin v. Hildebrand, 493
So. 2d 75, 76-77 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986) (public policy against self-indemnification for intentional
wrongs not offended in uninsured motorist action brought by insured). But cf. Carter v. Carter,
88 So. 2d 153, 158 (Fla. 1956) (beneficiary of life insurance policy cannot intentionally kill and
then collect proceeds on life of victim).
22. 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977); see also St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing
Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 1979) (intentional wrongs in Alabama include both
intending injury and intending act that "reasonable and ordinary prudence would indicate likely
to result in injury"); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456, 459, 471 A.2d 1166, 1167
(1984) ("intent" refers to intention in mind of insured at time of action resulting in injury).
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scope of intentional.acts under an insurance agreement. In Hartford,
appellee was sued for assault and battery and sought recovery from
appellant insurer under two distinct insurance policies.2 3 The court
denied recovery under the homeowner's policy because the contract
expressly excluded harm intentionally caused by the insured.2 The
court allowed recovery, however, under a separate personal catastrophe policy that covered several intentional acts,2 although assault
26
and battery was not listed among them.
The Hartford court held that, absent insured's intent to cause
harm, insurance may cover intentional acts.2 Public policy, however,
precludes insurance recovery for deliberately harmful acts. ' Although
appellee insisted that his spontaneous act caused unforeseeable harm,
the court found foreseeability irrelevant.2 Because appellee acted with
the specific intent to cause harm, even the extent of the harm did not
qualify the assault and battery as an accident under the homeowner's
policy.30 The court found coverage, however, under a personal catas-

trophe policy that did not specifically exclude assault and battery. The
court construed the contract in favor of the insured, thus also ensuring
victim compensation. 31

23. Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 650.
24. Id. The homeowner's policy covered bodily injury caused by an "occurrence." The policy
defined "occurrence" as an "accident," excluding damage that the insured intended to cause. Id.
25. Id. at 652. The separate personal catastrophe policy covered "personal injuries" and a
number of intentional torts. Id.
26. In extending recovery to an act not expressly included in the policy, the Hartfordcourt
turned the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" on its head. In essence, the court
distinguished disparate treatment from disparate impact, and extended coverage to intentional
acts, but denied coverage for intentional harm. See Solo Cup. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d
1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1980) (disparate treatment requires discriminatory motive; disparate impact
results not from discriminatory motive, but from discriminatory results from facially neutral
criterion).
27. Hartford,343 So. 2d at 651. An injury is intended ff 'the insured acted with the specific
intent to cause harm to a third party." Id. at 652 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Browning, 598
F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Or. 1983) (harm must be intended, although some acts are so certain to
cause harm that intent is presumed); Cloud v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1971)).
28. Id. at 651; United Servs. Auto. Assoc. v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 371, 517 A.2d
982, 986-87 (1986) (exclusionary clauses in Pennsylvania apply only when insured intends harm);
cf. cases cited supra note 18 (public policy considerations). But see Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F.
Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. La. 1978) (tort law aspires to compensate victims and deter wrongdoers).
29. Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 651.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 652.
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The Florida Supreme Court further extended coverage for intentional acts in Everglades Marina, Inc. v. American EasternDevelopment Corp.

In Everglades, appellees stored boats inside appellants'

marina. 3 The marina owner set fire to the marina, damaging appellees'
boats. After paying the damages, appellees' insurer sought indemnification from appellant and its insurer. On certification,3 the court
acknowledged that Florida public policy precludes recovery for losses
resulting from an insured's intentional criminal acts.3 The court asserted, however, that because appellees were third party beneficiaries,
6
they stood beyond the reach of public policy3
Limiting its holding to third party beneficiaries, the Everglades
court held that absent an express exclusion, public policy does not
bar insuring against one's own criminal acts.3 Because the third party
beneficiaries played no role in the criminal acts, adhering to public
policy would punish innocent parties.38 The Everglades court refused
to make appellees bear the brunt of appellant's misdeed. To protect
the innocent, the court refused to read into appellant's contract a
clause excluding criminal acts. 9 The court thus favored the interests
of both the victims and the insured at the expense of the public's
interest in deterring criminal conduct.
In Zordan ex rel. Zordan v. Page,40 the Florida Second District
Court of Appeal revived the Hartfordintent restriction while adhering
to the victim orientation found in Everglades. The insured appellee in
Zordan was accused of sexually fondling a child. 41 A clause in the

32. 374 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 1979). The Everglades court ignored the issue of whether
intentional acts or intentional harm preclude recovery.
33. Id. at 518.
34. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit presented two certified
questions to the court. After restating the first question, the court found it unnecessary to
reach the second. Id.
35. Id. at 519.
36. Id.; see Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1969) ("third party beneficiary
doctrine encompasses... cause of action against insurer in favor of members of public injured
through acts of insured").
37. Everglades, 324 So. 2d at 519.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Everglades extension of coverage to criminal conduct presumably encompasses
tortious conduct. By allowing coverage of criminal conduct, the Everglades court has broadened
recovery to acts that display the community's disapproval through criminal penalties. See Public
Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 398, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422,
426 (1981) (mere fact that an act has penal consequences does not mean public policy precludes
insurance coverage for same act).
40. 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987).
41. Id. at 608.
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insurance policy excluded intentional injuries from coverage, and appellees 2 maintained that the clause precluded recovery.4 Appellantchild sought to uphold coverage by arguing that the exclusion would
not apply unless the insured specifically intended injury."4
Applying the Hartford specific intent requirement, the Zordan
court supported appellant's position that coverage could apply.45 By
abandoning the third party beneficiary restriction, the court broadened
the potential scope of recovery. 46 The court reasoned that because the
insurance policy did not expressly presume an intent to harm in sexual
molestation cases, freedom of contract favored the insured. 47 In certain
contexts, acts of sexual molestation justify presuming an intent to
injure;48 but certain that the vague facts of Zordan could not support
such a presumption, the court remanded the case for additional findings.

49

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Frank chastised the majority for
ignoring the intentional harm inherent in any act of sexual molestation. 5 Judge Frank insisted that damage was as certain to arise from
sexual molestation as from an intentional punch in the face.5 ' Admonishing the court for not applying a foreseeability test, he feared
that the stricter specific intent test would not deter wrongful acts. 2
In the instant case, the court ignored Zordan'sintent test. Instead,
the court used public policy to extend coverage to intentional acts of
religious discrimination.5 Relying in part on Everglades, the court
emphasized that a victim's interest in compensation outweighs the
public's interest in punishing wrongdoers.54 In addition to the victim's
interest, the court recognized an interest in protecting employers from

42. Id. at 608. Both insured and insurers were joined as appellees. Id.
43. Id. at 609.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 612. The court reversed and remanded for trial, finding "no basis to conclude as
a matter of law that coverage is excluded." Id. The court decided not to deny insurance at this
stage. Id. at 613.
46. Id. at 610.
47. Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 609.
48. Id. at 611-12.
49. Id. at 612.
50. Id. at 614 (Frank, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 613.
52. Id.
53. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 946-48.
54. Id. at 946.
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discrimination suits.r Uninsurable damage awards could have a fatal
effect on businesses.
While the court noted that businesses need shelter from adverse
judgments, it also acknowledged that public policy condemns discrimination.57 Because built-in safeguards uphold this policy, the court rejected the claim that insurance coverage encourages intentional discrimination.1 First, imposing uninsurable punitive damages effectively
deters wrongful conduct. 59 The court also contended that the insurance
marketplace adequately serves this public policy. Insurance companies would refuse to insure chronic discriminators. 61 Further, insurers may exercise their freedom of contract to advance the public policy
of deterring discrimination, simply by excluding coverage for discrniinatory acts.6 Therefore, unless specifically excluded from the
agreement, coverage extends to intentional religious discrimination.
In his dissent, Judge Ferguson faulted the majority for placing the
victim's interest in compensation above society's interest in punishing
wrongdoers.6 He cautioned that insurance coverage would encourage
discrimination,4 and denied that the economic health of wrongdoers
justified legitimizing intentional discrimination.r He also questioned
whether the insurance marketplace would deny coverage to parties
that discriminate.c- Finally, Judge Ferguson concluded that public policy must give effect to constitutional and statutory provisions against

55. Id. at 948. The court noted that over 70,000 employment discrimination claims had been
filed with the EEOC in 1983. Id.; cf. Chen, Insurance of Section 1983 PunitiveDamages: Wrong
Law, Wrong Result, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 533, 542 (1984) (uninsurable punitive damages in § 1983
suits have chilling effect on official action only in areas of questionable legality).
56. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 948. But see Lenz, supranote 16, at 328 (mandatory self-insurance
will have deterrent effect on employers' wrongful conduct).
57. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 946-48.
58. Id. at 948.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; but see Sugarman, supra note 19, at 579 ("IT]he risk that an insurer will drop a
policy holder is small. Besides, most reasons why insurers decide not to renew are irrelevant
to individual deterrence ....
[Elven where this [nonrenewal] threat is real, the insured can
... find a ...
comparable insurer.").

62. See Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 947-48 (citing Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp.
1273, 1284 (E.D. Wis. 1981)).
63. Id. at 948-52 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Analogizing to the goals of uninsurable punitive
damages, Judge Ferguson placed deterrence above victim recovery as a public aim. Id. at 952
(citing Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962)).
64. Id. at 951.
65. Id. at 952.
66. Id. at 951.
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discrimination,67 since a lack of criminal sanctions deprives those provisions of meaningful force6 Therefore, public policy must forbid insurance coverage for intentional discrimination. 9
A fundamental premise in the instant case is that society has an
interest in discouraging religious discrimination. Insurance also serves
a societal interest by protecting both the injured party and the hapless
defendant.70 But with regard to intentional wrongs, the issue becomes
whether coverage encourages wrongful conduct. Recent decisions have
resolved this issue under a philosophy that favors compensation for
71
victims of intentional wrongs.
The Hartford court applied a victim-oriented philosophy cloaked
in an analysis of the term "intentional."' Hartford satisfied society's
deterrence interests by denying recovery under the homeowner's policy for an intentional assault and battery.7 The court also satisfied
victims and the insured by finding coverage under a separate personal
catastrophe policy. 74 In essence, the Hartford court promulgated two
separate tests: a specific intent test 75 and an express exclusion test. 76
After Hartford, the specific intent test gave courts leeway to prohibit
insurance recovery. Because the instant court raised victim compensation above society's deterrence objectives, however, it avoided the
Hartford intent restrictions on recovery. Rather, the instant court
utilized the second Hartford approach,7 extending coverage except
where expressly excluded. 78
An express exclusion requirement upholds freedom of contract,
but presents two basic problems that the instant court did not address.

67. Id.; cf. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 54, 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (duty of courts to
give effect to existing constitution); Lenz, supra note 16, at 325 (society has vital interest in
preventing recurring violations of fundamental rights).
68. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 951-52 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. See Brown, supra note 19, at 538 ("Absolute deterrence is not an appropriate goal
... . The trick isto find the level of activity which produces no more than a tolerable level
of harm.").
71. See Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 613; Everglades, 374 So. 2d at 519; Hartford,343 So. 2d at 652.
72. Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 650-52.
73. Id. at 652. The homeowner's policy covered bodily injury caused by "accidents," excluding damage that the insured intended to cause. Id. at 650.
74. Id. at 652. The separate personal catastrophe policy covered "personal injuries" and a
number of intentional torts. Id.
75. Id. at 651.
76. Id. at 652.
77. Id.
78. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 946.
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First, society's interest in deterrence precludes appointing insurance
companies as the arbiters of civil rights. Second, freedom of contract
extends only to contracts that are not contrary to public policy. 79
Hartfordleft open the door to prohibiting coverage for intentional
wrongs.80 Everglades began to close the door by allowing third parties
to recover for damages from intentional wrongs."1 By extending recovery, Everglades revoked the intent requirement of Hartford.2 Because
coverage reaches intentional harm, courts no longer must consider
whether the insured intended the harm.
In rejecting the intent test, the Everglades court revealed its preference for victim recovery. The court, however, limited recovery to
third party beneficiaries' direct recovery from the insurance company. 3
Thus, under Everglades one may not seek indemnification for one's
own intentional wrongs 4 As the instant majority observed, this third
party restriction may be a hollow one., An insured's refusal to satisfy
a judgment forces the victim to bring a second suit, against the insurer."6 Since an insured would presumably resist paying a victim, the
third party restriction creates litigation.s,
Despite the shortcomings of the third party restriction and freedom
of contract arguments of Everglades, the Florida Supreme Court did
not foreclose use of the specific intent test. The instant court thus
retained ample means to further society's deterrence objectives.
Rather than exercise this option, the court argued that insurance for
intentional wrongs does not encourage the covered behavior.3

79. See Skyline Harvestore Sys. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983)
(court does not hesitate to invalidate contract that contravenes public policy (citing Wunschel
Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Iowa 1980))); see also Palm Beach Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 831, 884 (Fla. 1974) (liberty of contract constitutionally
guaranteed, but degree of guarantee determined in light of social and economic conditions). But
cf. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927) (no fixed rules by which to define public
policy); Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (state has more
than one public policy).
80. Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 652.
81. Everglades, 374 So. 2d at 518.
82. In its analysis, the Everglades court did not address whether intentional wrongs or
intentional harm preclude recovery.
83. Id. at 519.
84. Id.
85. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 946.
86. Id. at 946 n.5.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 947-48.
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The court's claim that the insurance marketplace would banish
discriminators is unpersuasive. s9 Insurers usually decide against renewal for reasons irrelevant to individual deterrence.90 The instant
court found deterrence in the sting of uninsurable punitive damages;91
logically, wrongdoers avoid conduct for which they are held responsible. Yet by admitting that uninsurable punitive damages deter wrongful acts, the court conceded the very point it sought to deny. Arguably,
any damage award, regardless of its label, deters the behavior that
prompted the award.9 The instant majority drew a bright line between
punitive and compensatory damages. By rigidly adhering to this distinction, the court elevated an interest in judicial certainty above that
of deterring religious discrimination.
The instant court not only doubted the deterrent effect of denying
coverage, but also identified the financial security of the insured as a
concern. 93 The increase in discrimination suits created the need to
protect businesses from adverse judgmentsY4 Thus, the instant court
raised the interests of insured wrongdoers above those of society.
Such a conclusion is inappropriate because society ultimately must
bear the cost of judgments, through increased premiums.95 In addition,
the chilling effect on businesses that the instant majority perceived
would act only in areas of doubtful legality.9 Liability might alert
potential discriminators to more closely examine their practices.

89. Id.
90. See Sugarman, supra note 19, at 579. Usually, for example, non-renewals occur when
an insurer withdraws from a geographic market or a class of customers. Id.
91. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 948; cf. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d
432, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1962) (Florida public policy prohibits insurance against liability for punitive
damages). But cf. Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages:A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1162 (1984) (if goal is to punish, most appropriate forum is criminal justice
system).
. may discourage negligent
92. See McNulty, 307 F.2d at 438 ("compensatory liability.
conduct as a side effect"). The McNulty court also acknowledged the possibility that "there is
enough of a punitive element in a tort system of liability based on fault." Id. at 441; see also
Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. La. 1978) (deterrence lies at the heart of tort
law, not merely that aspect labeled "punitive").
93. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 948.
94. Id.
95. See U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1068 (Fla. 1983) (no public policy
served by shifting burden of damages to insurer and society at large); see also Sales & Cole,
supra note 91, at 1162 (innocent consumer and taxpayer bear burden of punitive award). But
see Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1282 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (not necessarily public
that suffers because burden may be spread among similarly situated violators).
96. Chen, supra note 55, at 542.
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Finally, discrimination is not the only intentional wrong disfavored
in our society, Hartford held that, at least under one policy, assault
and battery presumes an intent to harm. 97 The Zordan court carried
the Hartford specific intent test to its logical extreme. Under Zordan,
only certain acts of sexual molestation carried the presumption of
intent to cause harm.9 Hartford presumed intent when an insult
prompted a spontaneous punch in the face. 99 Zordan, however, did
not presume intent to harm in acts of continued sexual molestation of
a child. 1 Therefore, Zordan reduced "specific intent" to an empty
term.
Despite Zordan, the instant court could have presumed intentional
harm from religious discrimination. Discriminatory practices-flow from
long-standing policy and contemplation, not from spontaneity. But the
instant court failed to address the intent issue. Instead, it disputed
the deterrent effect of punishing wrongdoers, 01 even though Hartford,
Everglades, and Zordan accepted the deterrence of criminal penalties. 112 Because intentional discrimination is not a criminal violation,103
the instant court's extension of coverage traded away the most effective remaining deterrent mechanism.'0 Thus, the instant court made
explicit what was implicit in predecessor cases: the preoccupation with
victim recovery dictates the permissible scope of insurance coverage. 105
The instant case put the finishing touches on a Florida judicial
philosophy that disputes the efficacy of deterrents. Perhaps the court
gave too little attention to the constitutional, statutory, and local con-

97. Hartford,343 So. 2d at 652.
98. Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 611-12.
99. Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 651.
100. Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 611.
101. Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 946.
102. Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 608 (sexual molestation of a child); Everglades, 374 So. 2d at
518 (arson); Hartford, 343 So. 2d at 650 (assault and battery).
103. But see Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 52 N.Y.2d 392 n.67, 425 N.E.2d 810,
814 n.67, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422,426 n.67 (1981) (criminal penalties do not preclude insurance coverage
for same act).
104. Uninsurable punitive damages also act as a deterrent, but juries award them inconsistently. Because jury discretion makes the award of punitive damages highly unpredictable, the
threat of an uncertain punishment is unlikely to cause wrongdoers to adjust their behavior.
Furthermore, punitive damages may have a questionable deterrent effect when the defendant
is a corporate entity. Just as an employer is not deterred by punitive damages awarded for an
employee's intentional act, an employee is not deterred when an employer must pay a punitive
award. See Sales & Cole, supra note 91, at 1160-61 & n.198.
105. But see Zordan, 500 So. 2d at 613 (compassion for victim should not play a part in
decisionmaking process).

982

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

demnation of discrimination. Until the Florida Supreme Court rules
on this issue, 10the courts are willing to place in the hands of insurers
the enforcement of the public's deterrence interest. An insurer's willingness expressly to exclude wrongful acts is the new repository of
civil rights.
Daniel B. Yeager

106.

See supra note 13.

